Understanding the Sunni Awakening with Complexity Theory

Concurrent to the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq between 2006 and 2008, Sunni tribesmen in the U.S. Marine‐controlled western Anbar province of Iraq experienced an “awakening” movement, which led them to side with U.S. and coalition forces. The Sunni Awakening demonstrates that individuals will often realign because of betrayal and opportunities for advancement. It also demonstrates that individual motives can have macrolevel social consequences. Complexity theory suggests that political factions will realign based on individual considerations that then develop into macrolevel movements. Complexity theory also combines both agency (in terms of microbehaviors) and structure (in terms of initial conditions). An important concept within the complexity literature is the idea of “critical mass.” Theories of self‐organization suggest that individual considerations aggregate to a point of critical mass to become macrolevel movements. In the case of Iraq, you had individuals who decided as individuals to align with the Americans, but the macrolevel Awakening movement did not gain momentum until enough individuals had joined the movement. This pattern suggests that complexity theory can be used as a framework for understanding how critical mass is achieved in realignment

Two Awakenings, One Process: Implications from the Sunni Realignment in Iraq, 2006-2007

There are several competing beliefs regarding how political factions at the sub-state level choose to align and realign during a state of armed conflict. This research draws upon current literature to provide a framework for comparing the Anbar and Baghdad Awakenings of 2006–2007. This research concludes that alignment and alliance building is a process based on structural constraints only at the point of institutional maturity, therefore the critical point in the realignment process for the U.S. military is at a point between an individual’s realignment and the wider community’s perception of their success

Does ISIS Satisfy the Criteria of an Apocalyptic Islamic Cult? An Evidence-Based Historical Qualitative Meta-Analysis

The U.S. has been battling ISIS and its forerunners for over two decades; however, ISIS continues to endure and expand. While described as a death cult by some political leaders and other key stakeholders, this assertion received little consideration in the scholarly literature. The purpose of this study was to ascertain whether ISIS satisfied the criteria of an apocalyptic Islamic cult through the application of a historical qualitative research design and meta-analysis. Based on the results, the null hypothesis that ISIS does not satisfy the criteria of an apocalyptic Islamic cult was rejected, and the hypothesis that ISIS satisfies the criteria of an apocalyptic Islamic cult was accepted. This outcome has significant implications regarding U.S. policy and how practitioners develop effective strategies to neutralize the threat

Current Trends in Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces

This paper assesses current trends in small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) technology and its applications to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. Of critical concern to SOF is that commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) sUAS technologies are relatively inexpensive, improving at a dramatic rate, and widely available throughout the world. Insurgents, terrorists, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and other nefarious actors have used COTS sUAS to conduct offensive attacks as well as to develop battlefield situation awareness; these technological improvements combined with their widespread availability will require enhanced and rapidly adaptive counter-sUAS measures in the future. To understand the most current trends in the unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) technology and their applicability to SOF, this paper analyzes the definition and classification of sUAS, their major applications, and characteristics. In the military context, UAS are principally used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), border security, counterinsurgency, attack and strike, target identification and designation, communications relay, electronic attack, remote sensing, and aerial mapping. As technology improves, smaller versions of sUAS will be used by both friendly operators and maligned actors (insurgents, terrorists, VEOs, nation states) as force multipliers for military operations. As armed forces around the world continue to invest in research and development of sUAS technologies, there will be tremendous potential to revolutionize warfare, particularly in context of special operations. Consequently, the use of sUAS technology by SOF is likely to escalate over the next decade, as is the likelihood of sUAS countermeasures due to the availability of the technology within nefarious organizations